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WHERE’S MY REFUND? HOW TO ADDRESS OVERPAID
DOMESTIC SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
ABSTRACT
Domestic support obligations are a source of much debate among
bankruptcy courts throughout the United States. Concomitantly, overpayments
of domestic support obligations are no exception. Courts across the nation are
split as to whether overpayments of support debts fall within the definition of a
domestic support obligation listed in 11 U.S.C. §101(14A). The specific
language enumerated in §101(14A) giving rise to the jurisdictional split pertains
to whether the debt in question is “in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or
support.” Courts that deem overpaid support debts as domestic support
obligations focus on the debt’s function at the time of the original agreement
whereas other courts reject this approach and view the overpayment as a simple
money judgment. This discrepancy has led to an inequity for families across the
nation as jurisdictions throughout the United States produce distinctive
interpretations of overpaid support debts. This Comment will specifically
analyze overpaid domestic support obligations with reference to the 11 U.S.C.
§507 list of priorities and §523 exceptions to discharge. In order to remedy the
jurisdictional split, I propose a new set of standards for bankruptcy courts to
follow when confronted with overpaid domestic support obligations.
Instead of understanding child support and alimony collectively within the
term domestic support obligation, I propose that the two obligations should be
considered independently. The emerging standards include three main factors:
(1) all domestic support obligations should be excepted from discharge, (2) the
overpayment of child support should be entitled to priority status whereas (3)
the overpayment of alimony should not. These standards are determined after
analyzing the jurisdictional split, Congress’s intent in drafting the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, the substance of the obligation, and the intent and current
condition of the parties. Exceptions to the standards arise when confronted with
unique circumstances; however, this interpretation should be followed as a
general rule.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts across the nation attempt to comply with two competing principles
laid out in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Code):1 (1) the debtor’s fresh start and (2)
the creditors’ right to payment.2 When confronted with an overpaid support
obligation,3 it becomes difficult for courts to appropriately apply these
principles.4 The Code inadvertently fails to clarify what “overpaid support
obligations” are and how these debts should be managed throughout bankruptcy
proceedings.5 This gap in the Code creates an inequity for families across the
nation because different jurisdictions produce differing outcomes on how these
debts are treated.
In the Southern District of Ohio, in In re Norbut, Margaret and Theodore
Norbut were divorced after twenty-seven years of marriage.6 The Judgment
Entry and Decree of Divorce dictated that Margaret was entitled to fifteen years
of alimony payments that remained in effect until Theodore’s retirement.7 Years
later, Theodore sought termination of the alimony payments in state court as a
result of his early retirement.8 After years of litigation, the state court
retroactively terminated his alimony payments, resulting in Margaret owing
$72,694.14 in overpayment expenses.9 Subsequently, Margaret filed a petition
under chapter 7 of the Code.10 Theodore then commenced an adversary
proceeding against Margaret seeking summary judgment for the nondischargeability of the debt declaring it a domestic support obligation.11 In other
words, while Margaret would no longer owe her other debts once she concludes
the bankruptcy process, her obligation to Theodore would survive. The
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio relied on the previous state
court decision and granted Theodore’s motion for summary judgment.12
Specifically, the court found “that an obligation consists of support whenever

1
Robert C. Yan, The Sign Says “Help Wanted, Inquire Within” — But It May Not Matter if You Have
Ever Filed (or Plan to File) for Bankruptcy, 10 AM. BANK. INST. L. REV. 429, 432 (2002).
2
Id. (citations omitted).
3
See infra Background Part B (explaining what a domestic support obligation entails).
4
See Beth Holiday, Annotation, Construction and Application of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act’s (BAPCPA’s) Provision Defining “Domestic Support Obligations” (11 U.S.C.A.
§ 101(14A)), 56 A.L.R. FED. 2D 439 (2011).
5
See generally 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 523.11 (16th ed. 2018).
6
In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199, 201–02 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008).
7
Id. at 202.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 205.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 211.
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there is a legal duty to pay such an obligation.”13 The court followed previous
decisions that found overpaid support obligations to be “in the nature of alimony,
maintenance or support.”14
In the Middle District of Florida, in In re Galiardo, Joyce Lynn Galiardo and
Frederick Galiardo were divorced in 1992.15 A separation agreement ordered
Frederick to pay Joyce alimony payments in installments over a number of
years.16 Following the satisfaction of the installments, Frederick unintentionally
continued to pay Joyce alimony for an additional two years.17 Upon recognizing
this mistake, Frederick brought suit in state court where Joyce was ordered to
pay him $222,650.00 for unjust enrichment.18 Subsequently, Joyce filed a
petition for chapter 7 relief under the bankruptcy code which was later converted
to a chapter 13 case.19 Similar to the Norbut case, the question at issue was
whether the $222,650.00 retained its character as a domestic support
obligation.20 In reaching its conclusion in In re Galiardo, the Bankruptcy Court
for the Middle District of Florida reasoned that Frederick did not have any
personal need for support in regard to the repayment of the debt.21 The court
found that the debt was not in the nature of support and therefore was not a
domestic support obligation.22 In contrast to In re Norbut, the bankruptcy court
in this case decided to overlook the state court’s decisions and declared the
overpaid debt as dischargeable.23
These two cases consider the same issue but reach two vastly different
conclusions.24 Both courts attempt to decipher how overpaid support obligations
should be treated under the Code. Different conclusions emerge because the
Code does not provide clear instructions on how to proceed when confronted
with an overpaid support obligation. This complication affects the personal lives
of individuals across the country.25 An equitable remedy must rise to the surface

13

Id. at 210 (internal citation omitted).
Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281, 289 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002)
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(B) (2019); see also In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 199, 210–11.
15
Galiardo v. Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897, 898 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 898–99.
19
Id. at 899.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 900.
22
Id. at 902.
23
Compare In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. at 902, with In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199, 211 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2008).
24
Compare In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. 897, with In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199.
25
See In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. 897; In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); In re Norbut,
14
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to allow individuals to obtain uniform treatment in bankruptcy proceedings
across the country.
Federal bankruptcy law and state family law inevitably overlap with one
another. Domestic relations are traditionally matters reserved for state courts,26
but once a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy relief, federal law comes into
play.27 The balance between state and federal law in bankruptcy is clear from
the plain language of the Code. The Code, throughout its many provisions,
respects the decisions of the states28 and looks to state law for guidance when
considering issues of family law that are not clearly discernable.29 When a
domestic support obligation (DSO) has been overpaid by a creditor, the relevant
state law must be addressed to determine the nature of the debt. When federal
bankruptcy courts neglect state court decisions, an incohesive, mechanical
approach is forced upon federal courts when deciphering whether a judgment
can be stretched to fit within the definition of a DSO or contracted to be excluded
from its terms. Because the Code does not provide clear guidelines on how to
settle an overpaid support debt, sound arguments can be crafted for either
interpretation resulting in inequitable outcomes.
This Comment proposes a new set of standards to remedy this inequity. The
standards are characterized as follows: (1) all overpaid DSOs must be excepted
from discharge,30 (2) the overpayment of child support should be entitled to
priority status,31 whereas (3) the overpayment of alimony and maintenance
should not be entitled to priority status. These standards are determined after
analyzing the jurisdictional split, Congress’s intent in drafting the Code, the
substance of the obligation, and the intent and current condition of the parties.
The division between alimony and child support is vital because the mothers and
fathers of society should not be disincentivized from continuing to pay their
child support. If an overpaid support debt is not returned to the provider, this
may cause future providers to withhold their child support payments. Exceptions

387 B.R. 199; Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002);
Kassicieh v. Mascotti, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4494 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
26
See In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 210.
27
See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2019).
28
See § 523(a)(5) (to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or
support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a
court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or
property settlement agreement . . . .).
29
See In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 210 (citation omitted).
30
An exception from discharge will allow a creditor’s claim to pass through bankruptcy unaffected.
31
See infra Background Part D.1.
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to the listed standards arise when there is a unique circumstance, but courts
should follow this interpretation as a general rule.
I.

BACKGROUND

This Comment first considers foundational principles underlying the
proposed standards. Generally, the foundation arises from (1) the family unit,
divorce, and support obligations, (2) the definition of a domestic support
obligation and how it relates to overpayments, (3) why overpayments occur, and
(4) how these debts function within the Code.
A. The Family Unit, the Introduction of Divorce, and Emerging Support
Obligations
The family unit is a delicate yet resilient facet of society. The significance
of bankruptcy decisions concerning overpayments of DSOs are best understood
through a discussion of the values and evolving functions of the family unit. The
family unit is the central and most important part of civilization.32 “Marriage and
family are perhaps society’s oldest and most resilient institutions.”33 Since the
creation of humanity, individuals have situated themselves into units of families
as a defense mechanism for various types of support.34 Over thousands of years,
families have surmounted economic, legal, and societal fluctuations while
evolving along the way.35 In whichever way a family decides to function, it is in
society’s best interest to create a positive outlook and environment for families
across the world.36 The legal system must consider familial values when
dictating how to treat certain DSOs within bankruptcy because efficient legal
systems are tailored to deep societal structures.
As time has passed, the family unit has endured the introduction of divorce.
Now commonplace in American culture, statistics from the American
Psychological Association indicate that forty to fifty percent of the American
population divorces.37 Because divorce is now recognized as a societal norm,

32
See William Bennet, Stronger Families, Stronger Societies, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 24, 2012, 6:43 PM),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/24/are-family-values-outdated/stronger-families-strongersocieties.
33
John DeFrain et al., Creating a Stronger Family: Why are Families So Important?, NEBGUIDE (Sept.
2008), http://extensionpublications.unl.edu/assets/pdf/g1890.pdf.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Marriage and Divorce, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/topics/divorce/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2020).
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the culture within the United States has adjusted and reconstructed family life to
reflect the notion that a traditional family unit is no longer necessary for the
success of future and current generations.38 Families will continue to prosper
when divorces are finalized appropriately. Couples may achieve divorce through
litigation or settlement, but similar to other lawsuits, couples may resolve
divorce by a settlement agreement commonly referred to as a separation
agreement.39 The creation of laws and regulations governing this new familial
norm of divorce has allowed society to develop ways to interact and integrate
divorced families into our communities in a way that does not threaten the fabric
of society.40
The way in which a family functions has far reaching effects.41 “Sustainable
societies depend upon strong families.”42 Anything that tampers with the
functioning of a family may cause widespread consequences that impact other
areas within society.43 For example, lower rates of educational success for
children emerge when families are confronted with high rates of poverty.44
Bankruptcy law destabilizes families by neglecting to address how overpaid
DSOs should be treated under the Code. The Code does not supply a uniform
set of standards for overpaid support obligations which results in an inequity
amongst families across the nation.
The Code intends for a uniform application of its laws.45 Nonetheless, a
jurisdictional split exists among bankruptcy courts on how to construe
overpayments of support obligations.46 This split affects families across the
country in dissimilar ways.47 In this instance, the continuous inconsistent
application of bankruptcy law has left families in a state of disarray. “The family
is the human institution most vital to the perpetuation of the [human] race, and

38
See Kristen Glaeser, Threatening the Fabric of Our Society: Divorce in Modern Societies, 4
OLGETHORPE J. OF UNDERGRADUATE RES. 1 (2014), https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1039&context=ojur.
39
Meredith Johnson, At the Intersection of Bankruptcy and Divorce: Property Division Debts under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 95 (1997).
40
See Glaeser, supra note 38, at 1.
41
See DeFrain, supra note 33.
42
Institute for Family Studies, Strong Families, Sustainable Societies, INST. FOR FAM. STUD. BLOG
(Sept. 18, 2013), https://ifstudies.org/blog/strong-families-sustainable-societies.
43
See id. (citing to studies showing that children are less likely to graduate from college when they do
not have a strong family unit).
44
Id.
45
See Joseph Pace, Bankruptcy as Constitutional Property: Using Statutory Entitlement Theory to
Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 119 YALE L.J. 1568, 1592 (2010).
46
See cases cited supra note 25.
47
See cases cited supra note 25.
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its sound ordering [is] the consideration of deepest social concern.”48 Society
encourages individuals to have strong familial values that the Code reflects.49
When litigation arises concerning overpaid DSO debts, bankruptcy courts must
diligently interpret these values within the Code and uphold standards that are
not contrary to society’s constructions.50
Child support and spousal support arise from separation agreements.51 Both
spousal support and child support were created as remedies available to
individuals upon separation and are currently used as bargaining tools in divorce
proceedings.52 Child support and spousal support serve as vital components of
divorce. Support obligations are often seen as contentious aspects of divorce
proceedings, but nonetheless, they must be settled in order to maintain the
equilibrium of the family unit. Without legal standards, the family unit would
fail to function properly following a divorce.
Child support is a legal mechanism for the support of a minor provided by
the child’s parents or legal guardians.53 Child support orders are at issue in a
multitude of contexts including divorce, annulment, and direct suits for child
support.54 The amount of support is determined by two main factors: (1) the
needs of the child and (2) the parent’s ability to pay.55 Children are the “true
assets of the State[,]” and protecting them is society’s highest priority.56 Child
support cases are controversial because setting guidelines in the best interest of
a child does not amount to a simple calculation.57 The future of the world is
determined by subsequent generations, and those generations learn and develop
from the consequences of the present.58 When confronted with a divorce,
children must be provided with adequate care and sources of stability for both
the success of themselves and the success of society.59 Court orders mandate

48

Robert W. Kelso, The Changing Societal Setting of Alimony Law, 2 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 186, 189

(1939).
49

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1), 523(a)(5) (2019).
See Bennet, supra note 32.
51
See Johnson, supra note 39, at 95.
52
See Judith G. McMullen, Spousal Support in the 21st Century, 29 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1 (2014).
53
See 1 Collier Family Law and the Bankruptcy Code ¶ 3.02 (16th ed. 2018).
54
See Amy H. Kastely, An Essay in Family Law: Property Division, Alimony, Child Support, and Child
Custody, 6 U. HAW. L. REV. 381, 416 (1984).
55
See id.
56
See Kelso, supra note 48, at 189.
57
See id.
58
See id.
59
See id.
50
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child support obligations and if a parent neglects those payments it can result in
serious legal consequences for contempt, including incarceration.60
Spousal support, otherwise known as alimony or maintenance, derives
directly from divorce proceedings.61 Spousal support is defined as any payment
made to a former spouse that is both for the sustenance and support of that former
spouse.62 A spouse, who made sacrifices and contributions during the course of
a marriage, must be able “to continue to live according to the economic standard
that was established during marriage.”63 Likewise, courts’ consider a spouse’s
“ability to pay” when rendering orders.64 Courts consider many factors when
deciding on an issue of alimony.65 Most jurisdictions have been moving away
from distributing awards of permanent alimony and have instead been awarding
increasing amounts of rehabilitative alimony.66 This new trend of alimony
distributions focuses more on the facts of the case instead of relying on sweeping
conclusions.67
Divorce and bankruptcy go hand in hand with one another. The correlation
between financial hardship and divorce is irrefutable.68 Financial distress is
oftentimes a direct cause of divorce for the vast majority of Americans.69 Once
a couple initiates a divorce proceeding, they incur more costs through the
process of divorcing.70 A typical divorce costs around $15,500, and a common
hourly rate for a divorce attorney is $250 an hour.71 Many individuals are left
60
See Tonya L. Brito, Fathers Behind Bars: Rethinking Child Support Policy Toward Low-Income
Noncustodial Fathers and Their Families, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 617, 619 (2012).
61
For the purpose of this comment, alimony and maintenance are considered interchangeable terms. See
Kelso, supra note 48, at 193.
62
See Kelso, supra note 48, at 193.
63
Toby Solomon, Trends in Alimony Law, 1989 N.J. LAW. 30 (1989).
64
See 1 Collier Family Law and the Bankruptcy Code ¶ 3.02 (16th ed. 2018).
65
See Solomon, supra note 63, at 30–31 (1989) (listing the actual need and ability of the parties to pay,
the duration of the marriage, the age, physical and emotional health of the parties, the standard of living, the
earning capacities, the length of absence from the job market and so on and so forth).
66
See Jeff Landers, What Divorcing Women Need To Know about Alimony ‘Reform,’ FORBES (May 17,
2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jefflanders/2013/05/17/what-divorcing-women-need-to-know-about-alimonyreform/#556764c51260.
67
See Laura W. Morgan, Current Trends in Alimony Law: Where Are We Now?, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 1,
2012),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gpsolo_ereport/2012/april_2012/current_
trends_alimony_law/.
68
Daniel A. Austin, For Debtor or Worse: Discharge of Marital Debt Obligations under the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1369, 1374 (2005).
69
Id. at 1374–75.
70
See Samuel Stebbins, How Much Does It Cost to Get a Divorce? 10 States with the Highest Price Tags,
USA TODAY, (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/11/26/how-much-does-cost-getdivorce-most-expensive-states/38446243/.
71
Id.

NOWAK_7.15.20

2020]

7/15/2020 2:08 PM

WHERE’S MY REFUND?

519

with a tremendous amount of debt post-divorce along with newly mandated
support obligations leaving bankruptcy as the only viable option.72 Bankruptcy
and divorce overlap when a debtor seeks to discharge obligations arising from a
divorce decree.73 This intersection has led to considerable litigation74 and
overpayments of support obligations are no exception.
B. Defining Domestic Support Obligation and Understanding How Its
Definition Affects Overpayments
A DSO is defined in § 101(14A) of the Code.75 The broad statutory language
listed in §101(14A) was added by the 2005 BAPCPA amendments76 and has
since been an area of much debate amongst bankruptcy courts in the United
States.77 A DSO is defined as:
[A] debt that accrues before, on, or after the date of the order for relief
in a case under this title, including interest that accrues on that debt as
provided under applicable non-bankruptcy law notwithstanding any
other provision of this title, that is-(A) owed to or recoverable by-(i) a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or such
child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible relative; or
(ii) a governmental unit;
(B) in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support (including
assistance provided by a governmental unit) of such spouse, former
spouse, or child of the debtor or such child’s parent, without regard to
whether such debt is expressly so designated;
(C) established or subject to establishment before, on, or after
the date of the order for relief in a case under this title, by reason of
applicable provisions of-(i) a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property
settlement agreement;
(ii) an order of a court of record; or
(iii) a determination made in accordance with applicable
non-bankruptcy law by a governmental unit; and
(D) not assigned to a nongovernmental entity, unless that
obligation is assigned voluntarily by the spouse, former spouse, child

72

See Austin, supra note 68, at 1375.
Id.
74
Id.
75
11 U.S.C. §101(14A) (2019).
76
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention & Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §801(a),
119 Stat. 23, 141 (2005).
77
Compare Kassicieh v. Mascotti, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4494 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007), with Galiardo v.
Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897, 900 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013).
73
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of the debtor, or such child’s parent, legal guardian, or responsible
relative for the purpose of collecting the debt.78

Most relevant to an overpaid DSO debt is whether the overpayment falls
within the language listed in section (B).79 When examining this provision,
courts are split on when and why DSOs stop functioning as means of support.80
Bankruptcy courts must understand how the overpaid DSO functions between
the parties and how the family originally construed it to determine if the debt fits
this provision.81 In deciphering how the overpaid DSO functions, a factor test is
created.82 The “courts look at many factors focusing on (1) the language and
substance of the agreement; (2) the financial situation of the parties at the time
of the agreement, including prospects for future income; and (3) the function
served by the obligation at the time of the agreement.”83 Some courts embrace
the third criteria of the factor test when determining if a debt is a DSO.84 These
courts find overpaid support debts to fit within the definition listed in
§ 101(14A), reasoning that, at the time of the agreement, the debt’s primary
function was in the nature of support.85 However, many other courts focus on
the second criteria of the factor test and assess the need for the refund.86 These
courts commonly render overpaid debts as money judgments and exclude them
from the definition listed in § 101(14A) because there was no need for the
refund.87
Labels attached to provisions in separation agreements do not signify certain
debts to be in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.88 Rather, courts
must look beyond the labels attached to debts when determining if the debt
retains its character as a DSO as defined by the Code.89 Though labels are not
conclusive, they may be important in deciphering the intent of the parties
involved.90 Courts may consider labels, but with much trepidation. DSOs have
78

11 U.S.C. §101(14A) (2019).
See Holiday, supra note 4, at 439.
80
See In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008); Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker
(In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002); Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 245 B.R. 91, 93
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
81
See Diane Brazen Gordon, Feature: Marital Debt Disputes in Chapter 13: Is the Debt a DSO?, 33-3
ABIJ 60, 61 (2014).
82
Id.; see also Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717, 723–26 (10th Cir. 1993).
83
Gordon, supra note 81, at 61; see also In re Sampson, 997 F.2d at 723–26.
84
See In re Baker, 294 B.R. 281.
85
See id.
86
See In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).
87
See id.
88
See Holiday, supra note 4, at 439.
89
Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 737 F.3d 670, 676–77 (10th Cir. 2013).
90
See Holiday, supra note 4, at 439.
79
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a powerful influence on personal bankruptcy proceedings because they are
constantly referenced throughout the Code. Therefore, courts must tread
carefully when the status of a familial debt is uncertain.91
C. Why Overpayments of DSOs Occur and Its Significance in Bankruptcy
Because support obligations are interwoven into divorce proceedings,
overpayments may emerge as a consequence.92 Overpayments stem from a
variety of circumstances including failing to timely end a wage garnishment,93
paying child support for children who are later found not to be biologically
related to the support provider,94 or unknowingly providing payments that are
no longer court ordered.95 Most frequently, overpayments occur because
litigation concerning these obligations persists while the payments are court
ordered.96 At the end of litigation, many state courts retroactively terminate
support obligations as deemed necessary in order to rightfully return outstanding
funds.97 Outside of bankruptcy, these overpayments would be ordered to be paid
back in full to the original support provider.
Within bankruptcy, courts are split on whether these payments are in the
nature of support as a DSO.98 Labeling this debt as a DSO determines whether
the creditor should be paid back and if so, to what extent. Throughout the Code,
familial obligations are afforded much significance.99 However, overpaid
support debts are not mentioned at all.100 This gap has caused much
consternation among bankruptcy courts because there is no clear answer on how
to address these types of obligations. Support obligations are vital tools in our
society, and we want to encourage individuals to pay these debts. Problems arise
from these fluctuating decisions because if an individual believes his or her
former spouse is financially distressed, he or she may stop providing support
obligations if the jurisdiction does not reimburse creditors for overpaid support
debts in bankruptcy proceedings.
91

See In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008).
See In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296; In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 210; Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v.
Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002); Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 245 B.R.
91, 93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
93
See In re Baker, 294 B.R. 281.
94
See In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296.
95
See Galiardo v. Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897, 899 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013).
96
See In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 210; In re Baker, 294 B.R. 281.
97
See id.
98
See In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 210; In re Baker, 294 B.R. 281; Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard),
245 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
99
See 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(1)(A) (2019).
100
See generally 11 U.S.C. (2019).
92
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D. Domestic Support Obligations Within the Bankruptcy Code
DSOs are given special treatment and receive much attention throughout the
Code.101 Specifically, DSOs are (1) given first priority102 for repayment from the
estate and (2) listed as an express exception to discharge in chapters 7 and 13.103
These provisions direct courts on how to treat DSOs themselves, but lack
guidelines for overpayments of these same support obligations.104 How these
provisions function and how courts have construed them in connection with
overpaid support debts is pertinent in understanding why a standard set of
guidelines is needed.
1. Domestic Support Obligations Listed as a Priority under 11 U.S.C.
§ 507
Priority claims play a significant role in bankruptcy proceedings. When
drafting the Code, Congress dictated that an unsecured105 priority claim will
receive special treatment.106 If the debtor’s estate produces distributable funds,
priority claims will be paid before other unsecured nonpriority claims.107 Prior
to the introduction of the 1994 amendments, domestic support obligations were
deemed nondischargeable but retained no priority status.108 After the 1994
amendments, DSOs were given seventh priority out of a list of nine.109 This
elevation resulted in DSOs being treated more stringently in bankruptcy
proceedings and reduced the chances that the claim would be subject to
preference attacks if it were categorized as a general unsecured claim.110
In 2005, BAPCPA radically changed a DSO’s position in § 507’s list of
priorities.111 Priority status is now distinguished among ten categories with
descending levels of priority. Congress elevated the position of DSOs from
seventh priority to first priority.112 This revision has resulted in larger payouts

101

See 1 COLLIER FAMILY LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ¶ 3.02 (16th ed. 2018).
See 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(1)(A) (2019).
103
See 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5) (2019).
104
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, §523.
105
Unsecured meaning that there is claim against the property.
106
See 11 U.S.C. §507 (2019).
107
Id.
108
See Lynne F. Riley, BAPCPA at Ten: Enhanced Domestic Creditor Protections and Enforcement
Rights, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 267, 271 (2016).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
See 11 U.S.C. §507 (2019).
112
See 1 COLLIER FAMILY LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ¶ 3.02 (16th ed. 2018); see 11 U.S.C.
§507(a)(1)(A) (2019).
102
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on DSO claims in various chapters within the Code.113 This distinction proves
Congress’s intent that pressing familial matters outweigh the debtor’s fresh start
and the interests of other creditors.
2. Exceptions to Discharge Under 11 U.S.C. § 523
A main objective of the Code is to provide the debtor with a fresh start.
Congress crafted § 523114 of the Code to balance the debtor’s fresh start with the
rights of creditors by designating a list of claims that are deemed to be
nondischargeable.115 Obligations in the nature of support have been excepted
from discharge since the Code’s enactment in 1978.116 When rendering support
obligations excepted from discharge, courts must be provided with independent
findings supporting the proposition that the debt is in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, or support.117 In a judicial proceeding, the party who seeks to have
the debt deemed nondischargeable bears the burden of proof under
§ 523(a)(5).118
Bankruptcy courts consider the totality of the circumstances when
determining if a debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. The
language of section § 523(a)(5) simply states “A discharge under [§] 727, 1141,
1192, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt for a domestic support obligation.”119 Bankruptcy courts
have understood this language to include various expenses surrounding the
DSO.120 Some expenses that courts have deemed nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(5) include mortgage payments, attorneys fees, psychologist, and
accountant fees.121 What is considered to be in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, or support is far-reaching and construed broadly by courts.122
Many debts that appear to be DSOs are not always excepted from discharge
under § 523(a)(5). These debts are not always excepted from discharge because
the presiding court has discretion in what is considered to be a DSO. If

113

See 1 COLLIER FAMILY LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ¶ 3.02 (16th ed. 2018).
See 11 U.S.C. §523 (2019).
115
See id.
116
See Riley, supra note 108, at 293.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2019); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(A) (2019) for the full definition of a
domestic support obligation.
120
See Riley, supra note 108, at 294295.
121
Id.
122
Id.
114
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§ 523(a)(5) is deemed inapplicable to a related debt, § 523(a)(15) may apply.123
The BAPCPA amendments reconstructed § 523(a)(15) to provide a safety net
for these related debts.124 The former version of § 523(a)(15), added to the Code
in 1994, required the non-debtor to file an adversary proceeding to prove the
debtor was able to pay the obligation and show that the detriment to the plaintiff
outweighed the debtor’s right to a discharge.125 Because courts commonly found
that the debtor was unable to pay, these assertions were routinely defeated.126 In
2005, BAPCPA eliminated this process and instead stated that a debt was
nondischargeable if it is owing:
[T]o a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor and not the kind
described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by the debtor in the course
of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, or a
determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit.127

Recent caselaw has construed § 523(a)(15) broadly to include debt divisions,
mortgages, car payments, and other nonsupport marital dissolution matters.128
Section 523(a)(15) is expansive; hence, overpayments of DSOs should easily
fall within the parameters of its terms. If a familial debt is “in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court of record,” the
debt will be excepted from discharge.129 Because of the language that Congress
included in §§ 523(a)(5) and 523(a)(15), all overpayments of DSOs should be
excepted from discharge.130
3. Lack of Guidance from the Code on How to Construe an Overpaid DSO
The Code does not provide a definition for the term “overpayment.”131
Because of this omission, case law is the only area of guidance dictating how
overpayments of particular debts should be construed.132 In dealing with
overpayments of DSOs, the case law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

123

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019).
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 523,
119 Stat. 23 (2005).
125
See Riley, supra note 108, at 295.
126
Id.
127
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019).
128
See Riley, supra note 108, at 296.
129
§ 523(a)(15).
130
§ 523(a)(15) does not apply in Chapter 13 cases.
131
See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2019) (listing definitions used within the Code).
132
See generally 11 U.S.C. (2019).
124
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Some courts follow the principle of reimbursement.133 These courts look to the
current function of the debt between the debtor and the creditor and thus, these
courts construe overpayment of a domestic support obligation as a simple money
judgment. This approach results in a pro-debtor outcome.134 In contrast, other
courts look to “the function served by the obligation at the time of the divorce”
for guidance when deciding if the debt falls within the nature of support.135
These courts find that an overpaid DSO still retains its character as a DSO at the
time the creditor has filed his or her proof of claim.136 This approach results in a
pro-creditor outcome. In order to remedy this discrepancy and respect family
law values, bankruptcy courts need to follow a uniform set of standards.
II. ARGUMENT: CREATING A NEW SET OF STANDARDS
All DSOs should be excepted from discharge. In addition, the overpayment
of child support should be entitled to priority status whereas the overpayment of
alimony should not. Exceptions to these standards arise when confronted with
extreme circumstances. These standards emerge after (1) analyzing the
jurisdictional split, (2) understanding Congress’s intent in drafting the Code, (3)
unpacking the substance of the obligation, and (4) deciphering the intent and
current condition of the parties.
A. Addressing the Jurisdictional Split
Overpayments of DSOs present a gray area within the Code that causes
courts to be divided on the issue. Debts that do not fit squarely within the
definition listed in § 101(14A) give rise to contentious judicial proceedings. “A
properly filed claim is presumed valid and is prima facie evidence of its own
validity and amount.”137 The presumption is rebuttable, but it is up to the
objecting individual to provide evidence to overcome the claim.138 Once the
party opposing the debt produces a basis for questioning the validity of the claim,
the burden shifts to the initial claimant.139 As a general rule, a party seeking to
except a debt from discharge or gain priority status bears the burden of proof
and must establish each element of his or her claim by a preponderance of the

133
134
135

See Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 245 B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
Id. at 94.
See Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717, 725 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal citation

omitted).
136
137
138
139

Id.
In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. 704, 708 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014) (emphasis in original).
See In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296, 298–99 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).
See In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. at 708.
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evidence.140 It is the creditor who must prove that the debt at issue is entitled to
be excepted from discharge or is entitled to priority status.141 Due to the gap in
the Code and the discontinuity in existing case law, the amount of
reimbursement that overpaid support creditors will receive varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The language BAPCPA added to the Code is not
unclear. Rather, the drafters did not anticipate the issue of overpaid DSOs. In
order to preserve the uniform application intended by the Code, the discrepancy
in the Code pertaining to the overpayments of DSOs must be ameliorated.
The jurisdictional split does not openly address the difference between
priority status and an exception to discharge. This distinction is significant
because each represents an isolated concept within the Code. This section
considers how the jurisdictional split addresses (1) priority status and (2)
exception to discharge. An inquiry into a support debt entails the same analysis
for both priority status and exception to discharge, but different results are
produced for both the creditor and the debtor. Priority status results in the
support creditor receiving his or her funds before other creditors whereas
exception to discharge means that the debtor may never forgo paying the
particular support debt.142 The question at stake for both inquiries is whether the
debt is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, and is thus a DSO.143
When a debt is considered a DSO, it is both excepted from discharge144 and
entitled to first priority status.145 When BAPCPA amended § 523(a)(15), some
courts relied on this provision to except an overpaid support obligation from
discharge rather than labeling the obligation itself as a DSO. Because of the
newly amended section,146 some courts chose not to consider the priority status
of overpaid support debts because only debts clearly labeled as DSOs are entitled
to priority status.147 How each court construes what overpayments of support
obligations encompass greatly impacts both the creditor and the debtor
throughout a bankruptcy proceeding.

140
See Martin v. Pelley (In re Pelley), Nos. 17-10007-BAH, 17-1011-BAH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3254
(Bankr. D.N.H. Sept. 26, 2017).
141
See id.
142
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5), 507(a)(1)(A) (2019).
143
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14)(A) (2019).
144
See § 523(a)(5).
145
See § 507(a)(1)(A).
146
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019).
147
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A) (2019).
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1. Priority Status Under Section 507(a)
On one side of the split, courts have ruled that overpaid domestic support
obligations are not DSOs at all and therefore are not entitled to priority status
under § 507(a)(1)(A).148 These courts emphasize the current application of the
debt.149 In other words, at the time the creditor demands to be reimbursed, the
debt is not considered a DSO if there is no current need for the support.150 The
debt is instead viewed as a money judgment that does not fall within the
definition listed in § 101(14A).151 For these reasons, courts will not find
wrongfully paid DSOs within the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support
and therefore these courts deny such claims priority status.
In In re Alewelt, a claim for maintenance reimbursement was at issue before
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois.152 Mr.
Hardin and the debtor were legally divorced in January 2010.153 The state court
ordered that Mr. Hardin would have custody of their one minor child but was
obligated to pay debtor $500 a month in spousal support.154 The state court then
deducted sixty-eight dollars from Mr. Hardin’s maintenance payment for child
support he was receiving.155 In March 2013, the state court retroactively
terminated the maintenance award as of June 1, 2011, because the debtor was
cohabitating with a new boyfriend.156 The court concluded that debtor owed Mr.
Hardin $42,953.86 in maintenance reimbursements.157 After further calculation,
the court found $6,384 worth of child support arrearage through March 2013,
and $12,624 through March 2014.158 On March 31, 2014 the debtor filed for

148
See, e.g., Martin v. Pelley (In re Pelley), Nos. 17-10007-BAH, 17-1011-BAH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS
3254 (Bankr. D.N.H. Sept. 26, 2017); Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 478 B.R. 419 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012);
Vaughn v. Reid-Hayden (In re Reid-Hayden), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 980 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 22, 2011); In re
Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 245 B.R. 91 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 2000); In re Lutzke, 223 B.R. 552 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998).
149
See In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. at 301.
150
See In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. 704, 712 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014) (“An established need for support is a key
factor in determining whether an obligation is in the nature of support.”).
151
See id.
152
Id. at 706.
153
Id.
154
Id. (in addition to a percentage of Mr. Hardin’s overtime income).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 707.
158
Id. at 706707. In 2014, the court also concluded that $42,953.86 was due to Mr. Hardin for
maintenance payments. Overall, there was $55,577.86 due to Mr. Hardin for support purposes.
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chapter 13 relief and Mr. Hardin timely filed a proof of claim asserting the full
amount159 as entitled to priority status as a domestic support obligation.160
The bankruptcy court determined that Mr. Hardin’s claim was not entitled
to priority status.161 In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized Mr.
Hardin’s “original obligation” as one in the nature of support.162 Instead of
honoring the character of the original obligation, the court questioned what the
purpose of the debt was as it stood at issue before the court.163 In analyzing the
debt, the court acknowledged the jurisdictional split and noted that there is “no
per se rule.”164 Because Mr. Hardin did not present sufficient evidence proving
his current need for the funds, the court determined the debt was not a DSO and
therefore not entitled to priority status.165
Many bankruptcy courts have agreed with the reasoning set forth in In re
Alewelt.166 Denying creditors priority status for overpaid DSOs leaves these
creditors without recourse. This outcome allows debtors to avoid paying the full
amount of reimbursement for support obligations ordered by state courts by
simply filing for bankruptcy.167 In turn, the creditor’s claim is treated as a
general unsecured claim, and if lucky, the creditor will receive just a small
portion of the total amount due and owing to him or her. Because of the financial
distress these debtor’s face post-divorce, there is a higher percentage of no asset
cases or the creation of low payment plans making claim reimbursement even
more difficult. Even though both courts and the Code have concluded that

159

The full amount owed to Mr. Hardin totaled to $55,577.86. Id. at 707.
Id.
161
Id. at 710.
162
Id. at 711.
163
Id.
164
Id. (emphasis in original).
165
Id. at 712 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014).
166
See Martin v. Pelley (In re Pelley), Nos. 17-10007-BAH, 17-1011-BAH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3254
(Bankr. D.N.H. Sept. 26, 2017); Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 478 B.R. 419 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012); Vaughn
v. Reid-Hayden (In re Reid-Hayden), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 980 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 22, 2011); In re Vanhook, 426
B.R. 296 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 245 B.R. 91 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000);
In re Lutzke, 223 B.R. 552 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998).
167
See In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. at 712.
160

NOWAK_7.15.20

2020]

7/15/2020 2:08 PM

WHERE’S MY REFUND?

529

enforcement of familial support obligations outweigh the debtor’s fresh start,168
it seems that rulings similar to In re Alewelt undermine that principle.169
In addition to the immediate consequences arising when courts deny
wrongfully paid support obligations priority status, there are also long-standing
implications. If an overpayment is not treated as a DSO, this poses serious
societal concerns. This view may cause support providers to pay closer attention
to the intricacies of their initial support obligations and contest payments on the
basis of fear of overpayment. If a support provider suspects that his or her exspouse is on the verge of filing for bankruptcy, this may trigger the support
provider to discontinue payments of support. These rulings present a slippery
slope; contrary to society’s construction, many individuals may begin to
disregard and neglect familial support obligations. When this occurs, greater
problems will surface affecting more than just the creditor and the debtor. They
will affect individual family units and society as a whole.
In contrast to In re Alewelt and similar decisions, a few courts have ruled
that wrongfully paid support obligations are DSOs and therefore are entitled to
priority status under § 507(a).170 These courts acknowledge that “one of the
consistent underlying themes of [the Code] is to accord great deference to
familial obligations.”171 Furthermore, the perception that support obligations in
the Code clearly outweigh the debtor’s fresh start is reiterated and emphasized
through these court opinions.172 While explaining why priority is afforded to
these debts, courts recognize that “principles of federalism require that in matters
that are traditionally reserved to state courts, any doubt[s] as to a statute[‘s]
interpretation are to be resolved in favor of not interfering with state court
matters.”173 These principles and ideologies emulate the idea that when dealing
with wrongfully paid familial obligations, the interest of creditors must be

168

See In re Taylor, 737 F.3d at 675.
Two provisions of the Bankruptcy Code except from discharge debts arising out of obligations to
the family: § 523(a)(5) excepts from discharge any “domestic support obligation,” as defined in
the Bankruptcy Code; and § 523(a)(15) excepts from discharge obligations arising in connection
with a divorce proceeding or settlement agreement. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), (15). “These
provisions reflect the congressional preference for the rights of spouses to alimony, maintenance
or support over the rights of debtors to a ‘fresh start’ free of debts.” (internal citation omitted).

169

See In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. 704.
See, e.g., Kerr v. Meadors (In re Knott), 482 B.R. 852 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012); In re Norbut, 387 B.R.
199 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008); Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2002).
171
In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 210.
172
See id.
173
Id.
170
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construed broadly and bankruptcy court decisions must not contradict state court
matters.174 Priority status is afforded to these debts because courts conclude that
the debt retained its supportive nature based on the initial obligation.175
A select number of courts consider overpaid DSOs to be in the nature of
alimony, maintenance, or support. In the Northern District of Georgia, Helen
Jean Knott (Knott) filed a petition for chapter 7 relief.176 Knott’s former
husband, William Meadors, filed a proof of claim for $41,581.79 arising from a
state court judgment ordering Knott to repay him for overpaid child support.177
Mr. Meadors categorized the debt as a DSO entitled to priority under
§ 507(a)(1)(A).178 Knott objected, arguing that the overpayment of child support
did not retain its character as a DSO because the debt was not current.179 The
court analyzed the definition of a DSO in the Code and found the debt to be in
the nature of support because the purpose of the initial payment was for the
support of the children and therefore, the court categorized the claim as a DSO
entitled to priority status.180 Hence, certain jurisdictions will allow overpaid
support debts to fall within the definition of a DSO.
Courts deciding in accordance with In re Knott follow a backward-looking
approach when confronted with overpaid support obligations.181 Most of these
courts outwardly reject the decisions of alternate courts that deny overpaid
support obligations priority status.182 In In re Baker, where an overpayment of
child support was at issue, the court stated, “the particular attention the above
decisions pay to the ‘need’ of the parent-creditor does not find support in the
statute.”183 The court in In re Baker continued to explain “it is noted that had
Congress wanted a court to take into account factors such as ‘need’ and/or a
disparity in the parties’ income, it certainty knew how to make its wishes
known[.]”184 The nature of support language that Congress includes in
§ 101(14A) when defining a DSO is different than the “need” of support.185
Since these courts rule out the requirement for “need” of support, the
174

See id.
See In re Baker, 294 B.R. at 288.
176
Kerr v. Meadors (In re Knott), 482 B.R. 852, 853 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012).
177
Id.
178
See id.
179
Id. at 853–54.
180
See id. at 856.
181
See, e.g., Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002).
182
See id. at 287.
183
See id. at 287 (referring to the decisions of In re Lutzke, 223 B.R. 552 (Bankr. D. Or. 1998) and
Lankford v. Drinkard (In re Drinkard), 245 B.R. 91 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000)).
184
In re Baker, 294 B.R. at 287.
185
See Kassicieh v. Mascotti, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4494 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
175
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overpayment is assessed based on the function the obligation served at the time
the agreement was created.186
A prominent and consistent underlying theme of bankruptcy law is to afford
familial obligations a substantial amount of deference.187 By doing so, courts
conclude that it would be counterintuitive to deny priority status to
overpayments of support obligations by defining them as money judgments.188
The Code acknowledges the importance of the family unit and its stability as a
highly regarded concept in our society.189 Courts reinforce this underlying
concept when they afford priority status to overpaid support debts in bankruptcy
proceedings.
Short term implications of affording overpaid support obligations priority
status arise in connection to the debtor’s fresh start. A fundamental goal of the
Code is to provide debtors with this notion of a fresh start.190 That is, the debtor
is freed from any personal liabilities owed to creditors.191 A debtor’s fresh start
is achieved through discharge192 and the more debts a debtor incurs, the further
he or she is from discharge. Although familial obligations are held in high
regard, it is possible that stretching the definition of a DSO to include an
overpaid support debt is too broad of an interpretation.193 When courts label
these overpayments as money judgments, they safeguard a debtor under the
Code and protect the principle of the fresh start.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, these decisions are arguably necessary
to keep familial obligations in high regard. If bankruptcy courts grant deference
to state court decisions it will promote a stable judicial environment. When
judicial decisions are respected amongst state and federal levels, family
members will be more likely to abide by their support obligations because there
will be a clear demarcation of what law families must follow. Hence, if an
individual is aware that there is no way to avoid a child support or alimony
payment, it is more likely that he or she will eventually provide that payment.
Moreover, the judicial branch in upholding the importance of family obligations
186

Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717, 723–26 (10th Cir. 1993).
See, e.g., In re Baker, 294 B.R. at 287–88.
188
See, e.g., In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199, 211 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008).
189
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 507 (2019).
190
See Process–Bankruptcy Basics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/process-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Oct. 27, 2018) (discussing a case from
1934 stating “it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”).
191
See id.
192
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328 (2019).
193
See In re Vanhook, 426 B.R. 296, 301 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).
187
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will shed a great amount of influence onto individuals who are confronted with
these obligations.
2. Exceptions to Discharge Under Section 523(a)(5) and (a)(15)
The jurisdictional split becomes vastly complicated when courts consider
exceptions to discharge. Because BAPCPA revised § 523(a)(15) of the Code,
many courts have overlooked the possibility of an overpaid support debt existing
as a DSO. Section 523(a)(15) provides that, in order to be excepted from
discharge in chapter 7 cases, the debt in question has to be connected to a divorce
decree.194 With this provision intact, whether the overpayment of a support
obligation is a DSO becomes an unnecessary analysis that many courts do not
even consider. However, the application of § 523(a)(15) is conditional to chapter
7 cases and creates a loophole for chapter 13 cases.195 If courts do not construe
overpaid support obligations as DSOs, then these debts may be discharged in
chapter 13 proceedings.196
Courts that determine an overpaid DSO is not excepted from discharge under
11 U.S.C. § 523 follow the same reasoning of courts who deny priority status
for these debts. Once again, these courts focus on the current need of the DSO
creditor.197 Most creditors who seek a reimbursement from an overpaid DSO do
not have the “need” for support. Because of this factor, many courts have
decided that these debts cannot be excepted from discharge.198 Cases concerning
DSOs are predominately dealt with in chapter 7 and chapter 13. With this in
mind, the Code notes in § 1328(a)(2) that debts falling within § 523(a)(15) are
dischargeable in a chapter 13 case.199 This gap in the Code allows debtors to
avoid paying certain debts, such as overpaid DSOs, because if the jurisdiction
does not consider wrongfully paid support obligations DSOs themselves, then
debtors will be able to escape that debt.200 This loophole is an area in the Code
the can be easily abused when overpaid support obligations are present.
194

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019).
See id.
196
See generally id.
197
See Martin v. Pelley (In re Pelley), No. 17-10007-BAH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3254, at *11–12 (Bankr.
D.N.H. Sept. 26, 2017); Galiardo v. Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897, 898 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013).
198
See In re Pelley, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3254, at *11–12; In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. at 898.
199
See 11 U.S.C § 1328(a)(2) (2019) (“[T]he court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided
for by the plan or disallowed under § 502 of this title, except any debt . . . of the kind specified in [§] 507(a)(8)(C)
[11 USCS § 507(a)(8)(C)] or in paragraph (1)(B), (1)(C), (2), (3), (4), (5), (8), or (9) of [§] 523(a) [11 USCS
§ 523(a)]”).
200
See In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. at 899–900 (explaining that § 523(a)(15) does not apply to the facts of
the case because the debtor converted her case from a chapter 7 to a chapter 13 and the debt in question does not
fall within the definition of a DSO).
195
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In In re Taylor, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit (BAP),
determined that an overpaid support obligation was nondischargeable pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).201 The debtor appealed arguing in her brief that
Congress intended a different result from the plain language of the statute.202
The BAP rejected her approach and instead stated, “there is no indication that
congressional concern extended to the protection of a debtor-dependent spouse
who may be responsible for repayment of wrongfully paid spousal support.”203
Bankruptcy is not a forum where a debtor can avoid alimony and child support
payments.204 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the BAP’s ruling supporting the
proposition that the overpayment of spousal support is nondischargeable in a
chapter 7 case under § 523 (a)(15).205 In affirming the BAP’s ruling, the Tenth
Circuit reiterated that the debt does not fall under the definition of a DSO and
therefore is not nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5).206 Due to this distinction, if
the debtor filed for relief under chapter 13, the debt would be dischargeable.
In In re Galiardo, the court held that an overpaid support debt was
nondischargeable.207 In this case, the debtor initially filed for chapter 7 relief and
owed her ex-spouse over $200,000 in excess alimony payments.208 The debtor
converted her case to chapter 13 soon after the debtor’s ex-spouse filed an
adversary proceeding against her.209 Once the debtor converted the case to a
chapter 13 case the bankruptcy court deemed the overpaid alimony debt
dischargeable, leaving the debtor’s ex-spouse unable to recover the debt.210 The
court concluded that, due to a lack of need by the debtor’s ex-spouse, the debt
was not in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support and thus the debt was
dischargeable under § 523(a)(5).211 This decision undermines the fundamental
principle of bankruptcy law that bankruptcy is not a forum where an individual
can escape support payments.212
Exceptions to discharge become convoluted and disordered when courts are
confronted with overpaid support debts. As seen in In re Galiardo, overpaid
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
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See Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 737 F.3d 670, 673 (10th Cir. 2013).
See id. at 681. (citing Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 2006)).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 682.
See id. at 676–77.
See Galiardo v. Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013).
See id. at 898.
See id. at 899.
See id. at 902.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2019); In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. at 899–900.
See H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 32, 54–55 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3342, 3363–
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support obligations can amount to a large sum of money.213 The Code should
not allow access to loopholes for individuals trying to avoid support obligations.
However, the application of § 523(a)(15) is conditional to chapter 7 cases,
therefore the Code inadvertently creates this loophole with regard to overpaid
support debts. Debtors can specifically file for chapter 13 or convert their cases
to chapter 13 to avoid this obligation.214 Hence, the distinction between priority
debts and non-priority debts is critical. The only ways to remedy the issue are
(1) for Congress to apply § 523(a)(15) to chapter 13 cases or (2) for courts to
construe overpaid support debts as DSOs under § 523(a)(5) and § 507(a)(1)(A).
Furthermore, when bankruptcy courts base overpaid support obligations on
current need, it defeats the purpose of the divorce decree and goes against the
authority of state courts. State courts consider a multitude of factors when they
determine support obligations.215 After much analysis and consideration, these
courts comprise their findings into a divorce decree.216 The divorce decree is a
highly regarded document that dictates how a family will continue to function
after a legal separation.217 Within the decree are support obligations that state
courts deem necessary. Because financial issues commonly arise between exspouses and ex-partners, overpayments occur, and state courts must order the
overpaid amount to be returned to the provider. By allowing debtors to avoid
repaying overpaid DSOs, bankruptcy courts are undermining state court
decisions.218 Bankruptcy courts must respect state court decisions concerning
domestic relations within their proceedings.
Some courts deem overpaid support debts nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(5).219 These courts follow the rationale that “[t]he critical question in
determining whether the obligation is, in substance, support is the function
served by the obligation at the time of the divorce [decree].”220 This notion
allows courts to except overpaid support debts from discharge in both chapter 7
and chapter 13 cases. These courts align themselves closely with the state court’s
findings. In doing so, these courts are respecting the intentions of the drafters of

213

See In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. at 899 (noting that the debtor owed her ex-spouse $222,650.00).
See id. at 898.
215
See generally 3 FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 33.05 (2018), Lexis (database updated November 2019).
216
See Johnson, supra note 39, at 95.
217
See Johnson, supra note 39, at 95, 97.
218
Cf. Norbut v. Norbut (In re Norbut), 387 B.R. 199, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008).
219
See Taylor v. Taylor, 737 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2013); Martin v. Pelley (In re Pelley), No. 17-10007BAH, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3254 (Bankr. D.N.H. Sep. 26, 2017).
220
See Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717, 725 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation
omitted).
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the Code.221
An example where a court found an overpaid support debt nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(5) is seen in Kassicieh v. Mascotti.222 The court in this case
considered an overpaid child support debt in the amount of $28,000 that arose
from a retroactive reduction.223 The court determined that the overpayments
“were made pursuant to an order for child support, and as such Kassicieh was
under a legal duty to make such payments.”224 The court found this legal duty
was in the nature of support and therefore considered the overpayment a DSO.225
This court followed the decision from In re Baker,226 which reiterates the notion
that an overpaid support obligation must be excepted from discharge as a
DSO.227 Similarly, the court in In re Baker concluded that courts should take a
broader approach when determining “whether an overpayment of . . . support
was entitled to favorable treatment under [the Code].”228
3. The Perpetuation of the Jurisdictional Split
As illustrated by case law, overpayments of DSOs are handled very
differently throughout the United States. Because bankruptcy is a matter of
federal law, there should be a uniform application of its provisions. The
disconnect between jurisdictions emerges when courts interpret the Code in
drastically different ways. In order to apply the provisions of the Code uniformly
and respect the intentions of the drafters, something must change. Since the 2005
BAPCPA amendments altered the language of § 523(a)(15) to include any debt
incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce or in connection with a court
order,229 all overpayments of DSOs should be excepted from discharge. The best
way to ensure overpayments of DSOs are excepted from discharge is to
eliminate the loophole available to debtors who choose to file for chapter 13
relief. This is important because, as we have seen above, overpayments of
support obligations can amount to a large sum of money. A debtor should not be
able to escape this type of debt by simply filing for relief through a different
chapter.

221
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See infra, Part B.
See Kassicieh v. Mascotti, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4494, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Allen Co. Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002).
Id. at 288.
See id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019).
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In order to understand how courts should handle overpayments of DSOs,
each support obligation must be considered separately. Child support must be
separated from alimony because each support obligation carries a different
amount of weight. As a general matter, when a creditor overpays a DSO, the
reimbursement of that overpayment should be excepted from discharge.
Furthermore, when analyzing (1) Congress’s intent in drafting the Code, (2) the
intent and current condition of the parties, and (3) the substance of the
obligation, the overpayment of child support should be entitled to priority status
whereas the overpayment of alimony and maintenance should not.
B. Congress’s Intent in Drafting the Bankruptcy Code
The drafters of the Code did not intend for bankruptcy courts to serve as
domestic relations courts.230 Traditionally, federal courts avoid issues of family
law because state courts retain expertise on these matters.231 In drafting the
Code, Congress reiterates this traditional approach in many of its provisions.232
Bankruptcy courts often declare that res judicata bars litigation of any matter
that was litigated or had the opportunity to be litigated in state court.233 The 2005
BAPCPA amendments further solidify Congress’s opinion that family law
matters are better left to be decided by state courts.234
The 2005 BAPCPA amendments created and defined the term, “domestic
support obligation.”235 Congress created this new term to provide more
protections to support claimants throughout the Code.236 The special treatment
DSO claimants receive extends to the automatic stay, priorities, exemptions, and
discharge.237 Not only does the Code reflect Congress’s opinion that issues of
domestic relations should be left to state courts, but it also reflects the opinion
that when a DSOs is included in a bankruptcy proceeding, it is the most
important claim to consider.238
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See 1 COLLIER FAMILY LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ¶ 5.01 (16th ed. 2018).
See id.
232
See id.
233
See id.; Milliren v. Milliren (In re Milliren), 387 B.R. 72 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008).
234
See COLLIER, supra note 230, at ¶ 5.01.
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See Holliday, supra note 4, at 439.
236
See id.
237
See id.
238
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(A)(1)(a) (2019); George L. III Clauer, Domestic Support Obligations in the
Bankruptcy Briar Patch, 20 S.C. LAW. 12, 14 (2008).
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DSOs are considered to be a super-priority claim.239 Because BAPCPA
afforded DSOs first priority under § 507,240 these claims rank higher than other
critical claims.241 Under the Code, DSOs must be paid off before taxes owed to
the IRS and trustee’s commissions.242 In § 522 of the Code,243 BAPCPA further
allows trustees to liquidate exempt property for DSO claimants.244 Property that
a debtor exempts remains liable both during and after a bankruptcy proceeding
to pay pre-petition DSO debts notwithstanding state exemption laws that state
the contrary.245 Hence, “[t]he BAPCPA amended bankruptcy code preempts and
eliminates the normally applicable state law exemptions with regard to prebankruptcy DSO debt for any property exempted in the bankruptcy case.”246
Additionally, the automatic stay does not stop the collection of DSO claims.247
Further, § 362(b)(2)(B) notes that the automatic stay does not stay the
enforcement of DSOs “from property that is not property of the estate[.]”248
These provisions clearly indicate that when a DSO is present in a bankruptcy
proceeding Congress denotes it as the most important debt to pay.249 The Code
designates many provisions to the extreme protection of DSO claims. With this
in mind, if certain types of overpaid support debts are considered to be DSOs
within the meaning of the Code, these are just a few of the treatments Congress
would afford to these claimants.
Many courts recognize the principles of federalism intertwined within the
bankruptcy code.250 The Code clearly acknowledges that state laws govern
domestic relations between husband and wife or parent and child.251 Bankruptcy
proceedings are a matter of federal law, but state law should be “consulted for
guidance” when determining whether an obligation falls into a certain provision
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See id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A) (2019).
241
See id.
242
See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(C) (2019) (excepting to the extent that the commissions are associated with
the DSO); Clauer, supra note 238, at 14.
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See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(1) (2019).
244
See Clauer, supra note 238, at 14.
245
See id.; see also § 522(c)(1).
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Clauer, supra note 238, at 14 (emphasis omitted); see Alan M. Ahart, The Liability of Property
Exempted in Bankruptcy for Pre-Petition Domestic Support Obligations after BAPCPA: Debtors Beware, 81
AM. BANKR. L.J. 233, 254 (2007).
247
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2019).
248
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B) (2019).
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See §§ 362(b), 522(c)(1).
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See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890), Sampson v. Sampson (In re Sampson), 997 F.2d 717
(10th Cir. 1993), In re Norbut, 387 B.R. 199, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008).
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of the Code.252 “Of equal importance, basic principles of federalism hold that in
matters which are traditionally reserved to the states—for example, domestic
relations—any doubt as to a statute’s interpretation should be resolved in favor
of not interfering in the state court matter.”253 If a state court determined an
individual overpaid a support debt, that debt would be court-ordered to be
reimbursed. This division of authority between state courts and federal
bankruptcy courts explains the jurisdictional split.
Implications arise for both the debtor and the creditor when bankruptcy
courts ignore state court decisions ordering support reimbursements. Debtors
may use bankruptcy as a way to avoid paying state court orders, such as overpaid
familial obligations. In other words, if a debtor is aware that the jurisdiction they
reside in refuses to regard overpaid support debts as DSOs, the debtor may
choose to file for bankruptcy to purposely avoid reimbursement. This negatively
affects creditors because many times, especially in chapter 7 cases, the debtor
does not have sufficient funds to repay unsecured creditors.254 Hence, overpaid
support claimants will oftentimes never see a penny that they overpaid to debtors
if they are categorized as general unsecured claimants.255 In these scenarios
where a support obligation is wrongfully paid, the claims of creditors arise
because of an initial support obligation. Congress did not intend to group these
claimants with every other general unsecured creditor. This outcome places too
much power in the hands of the debtor, leaving the creditor at a grave
disadvantage.
On the other hand, when bankruptcy courts respect state court decisions, a
pro-creditor outcome prevails. When wrongfully paid support obligations are
considered DSOs within the meaning of the Code, debtors are unable to use
bankruptcy as a way to avoid reimbursements of support obligations. This, in
turn, forces potential debtors to pay their debts. This is what Congress prefers;
Congress did not draft the Code to allow debtors to use bankruptcy as a way out
of dealing with familial hardships. This approach is proven by the many special
provisions in the Code favoring DSO claimants.256 Unfortunately, when drafting
the Code, Congress likely did not think about what would result if there were to
252
In re Norbut, 387 B.R. at 206; see also In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1983); Allen Co.
Child Enf’t Agency v. Baker (In re Baker), 294 B.R. 281, 284 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002).
253
In re Baker, 294 B.R. at 288.
254
See Ann K. Wooster, Construction and Application of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(a), Concerning Judicial
Approval of Compromise or Settlement in Bankruptcy Proceeding – Based on Paramount Interest of Creditors,
35 A.L.R. FED. 2D 209 (2009).
255
See Alexander F. Clamon, Per Se Bad Faith? An Empirical Analysis of Good Faith in Chapter 13 FeeOnly Plans, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 473, 474 (2014).
256
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 507(a)(1)(A), 523(a)(5) (2019).
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be overpayment of a support obligation. Courts, instead of utilizing the plain
meaning in the definition of a DSO, have instead substituted the word “need”
for “nature” when determining if an overpaid support debt fits within the
definition.257 The Code’s definition of a DSO does not use the word “need.”258
Rather, courts must take a step back and look to see if the debt is in the nature
of support before constructing their own definition contrary to the one listed in
§ 101(14A).259 When courts recognize that certain overpaid support debts are
DSOs, creditors will rightfully be afforded all of the privileges listed for DSO
claimants and reimbursed for their wrongfully overpaid support debts.
When analyzing the rights of the debtor, DSO claims critically hinder the
fresh start principle because the Code affords super-priority benefits to DSO
claimants.260 If the debtor is unable to reimburse the support obligation during
the bankruptcy proceeding, then he or she will be liable to the DSO claimant
post-petition.261 Despite the impact of super-priority benefits, Congress
purposefully included them in the Code. When Congress drafted § 523 of the
Code, it reiterated the notion that familial debts rightfully outweigh the debtor’s
fresh start.262 Therefore, a broad definition of a DSO follows the intent of
Congress.263
C. The Substance of the Obligation: Distinguishing Between Child Support
and Alimony
To determine whether a debt falls within the nature of alimony, maintenance,
or support, courts must consider the substance of the obligation. All support
obligations are not the same. Particularly, courts should distinguish alimony
from child support when deciphering if an overpaid support debt should be
excepted from discharge or entitled to priority status. Generally, all support
debts should be excepted from discharge; the overpayment of child support
should be entitled to priority status whereas the overpayment of alimony should
not. The analysis of the particular support obligation will help to explain this
general rule and the exceptions that emerge.

257

See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2019).
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Generally, the overpayment of child support should be excepted from
discharge and entitled to priority status. Child support serves as an inherent
requirement amongst split families within our society.264 Due to this societal
construction, overpaid child support debts should be treated more favorably than
overpaid alimony debts. “[M]odern child support treats parent-child ties as more
lasting than spousal relationships and independent of the relationship between
[parties].”265 In order to encourage support providers to continue making
payments for their children, overpaid child support claimants must be
reimbursed for support payments that were not necessary for the adequate care
and protection of the child.
Child support is a complex concept.266 It is essential to make sure children
who are not residing with two parents are receiving adequate care and
protection.267 Often times, individuals end up as overpaid child support
claimants when state courts retroactively terminate support payments.268 When
a state court determines that a support provider has overpaid child support, there
should be a more forgiving interpretation allowing for reimbursement within the
Code. It is likely that overpayments of child support emerge from good faith
intentions for the protection, safety, nourishment, and health of the child or
children involved. Hence, the overpayment falls within the nature of support.
The overpaying support claimant should not be penalized for doing everything
in his or her power to provide for his or her children. Therefore, all overpayments
of child support should be excepted from discharge and entitled to priority status.
When overpaid child support claimants are not rightfully reimbursed,
consequences arise. “There is a strong public policy objective of protecting the
best interests of the child.”269 Financial support is pertinent so that the child will
not suffer economic hardships due to the parents’ action or inaction.270 The
concept of the best interest of the child will be overlooked if these creditors are
not reimbursed. If a child support provider is aware that his or her ex-spouse is
suffering from financial hardships, which is not rare before, during, or after a
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See Clauer, supra note 238, at 14.
Ann Cammett, Deadbeats, Deadbrokes, and Prisoners, 18 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 127, 132

(2011).
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See Adrienne J. Lockie, Multiple Families, Multiple Goals, Multiple Failures: The Need for “Limited
Equalization” as a Theory of Child Support, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 109 (2009).
267
See Judith G. McMullen, Prodding the Payor and Policing the Payee: Using Child Support Trusts to
Create an Incentive for Prompt Payment of Support Obligations, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 439 (2018).
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Overpaid child support claimants emerge when child support funds are overpaid either to an ex-spouse
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divorce proceeding, the provider may be inclined to stop providing child support
payments. This is because the support provider is aware that he or she might not
be reimbursed if the payments are eventually deemed to be unnecessary funds
in front of a bankruptcy court. The judicial branch should be encouraging
payments of child support, not discouraging. This is a detrimental effect arising
from bankruptcy courts ruling that overpaid child support debts are either not
entitled to priority status or entirely dischargeable under the Code.
Two exceptions arise when confronted with overpaid child support
obligations. The first exception pertains to priority status. When the creditor is
knowingly overpaying his or her child support, that creditor should not be
afforded priority status. If the overpayment is not controlled by some sort of
pending litigation and the creditor is aware that the payments he or she is making
are not court ordered, then it follows that the debt should not fall within the
definition of a DSO and therefore should not be entitled to priority status. Even
though the debt is not categorized as a DSO in the nature of alimony,
maintenance or support, it should still be excepted from discharge under
§ 523(a)(15).271 Because child support is connected to the divorce decree, the
debt should be deemed nondischargeable. Overall, when the creditor is fully
aware that his or her child support payment is no longer enforced by the
controlling state court, that creditor should not be afforded priority status
because the child support debt is not a domestic support obligation in the nature
of support.
The second exception pertains to exceptions to discharge. When an overpaid
child support claimant does not have primary custody of the children involved,
and the quality of life of the young children is inadequate, the overpayment
should be dischargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding. In other words, if the debtor
has primary custody of the children and the payments from the creditor are
necessary for the adequate care of the children, the creditor should not be
reimbursed when the debt amounts to an overpayment. This goes back to the
public policy objective of serving the best interests of the child.272 If the child in
question is not receiving adequate care, society must do everything it can to
protect this child. Courts must take this scenario into consideration when
determining if a debt should be excepted from discharge. Even though the debt
is connected to a divorce decree, the interests of the child outweigh the rights of
the creditor. In this sense, the DSO is still due and owing to the child in the care
of the debtor.
271
272

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019).
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In comparison to the overpayments of child support, the overpayments of
maintenance and alimony should not be treated as favorably. This is partly
because “parenting involves a more predictable set of obligations” than
marriage.273 In other words, the parent-child relationship lasts longer than the
spousal relationship.274 Furthermore, child support payments are much more
important than alimony payments. When confronted with alimony payments, the
person receiving support is an adult capable of providing for themselves; when
confronted with child support payments, the person receiving support is a minor
who is incapable of providing for themselves. Because of this distinction,
overpaid alimony claimants should not be afforded all of the rights that overpaid
child support claimants receive. Generally, the overpayment of alimony should
not be entitled to priority status but should always be excepted from discharge.
When confronted with an alimony payment, the person providing support
should be held to a higher standard of diligence. This standard should be applied
because the person providing support is generally an adult who is capable of
providing for his or her own self. Furthermore, “[c]urrent social attitudes seem
to hold that women and men have equal opportunities to become self-supporting
in the paid work-force and equal obligations with respect to home and family
care.”275 This statement supports the proposition that current trends have been
moving toward providing alimony as a rehabilitative tool and not a lifelong
safety net.276 Because modern day alimony payments serve to prepare the former
spouse’s entrance into the workforce,277 the person providing support should be
up-to-date and cognizant of the alimony payments that he or she is ordered to
provide by the court. If, after satisfying all payment obligations, the support
provider continues making payments without realizing that such payments are
no longer mandated, the burden should be placed on the overpaying creditor in
a bankruptcy proceeding.
This standard of diligence takes an overpaid alimony debt and renders it a
money judgement within the Code. The debt is connected to a divorce decree
and hence excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(15).278 The overpaid alimony
creditor, in being held to this standard of diligence, retains a claim that is not in
the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. Therefore, the claim is not

273
Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Review of From Partners to Parents: The Second Revolution in Family Law
by June Carbone, 35 FAM. L.Q. 833, 835 (2002) (internal citation omitted).
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categorized as a DSO. Due to this distinction, the creditor should not be afforded
priority status, but rather be treated as a general unsecured claimant whose debt
is excepted from discharge.
One exception arises from this general rule. This exception pertains to
priority status. If the alimony provider is being manipulated by the alimony
recipient in a way that is deemed to be malicious and deceitful, the support
provider should be entitled to priority status for his or her overpaid alimony debt.
This often occurs when ex-spouses have a hostile relationship. Oftentimes, when
the recipient remarries, the alimony provider’s payment obligations terminate.
In an effort to sustain alimony payments, the ex-spouse that contemplated
remarriage may decide to reside with his or her new partner in a way that
resembles a common-law marriage.279 This is a form of manipulation because if
there had not been alimony payments, the ex-spouse would remarry without
hesitation. In situations like these, the overpaid alimony creditor should be
afforded first priority status because the payment would amount to a DSO in the
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.
The substance of the obligation must be scrutinized when deciding if an
overpaid support debt should be entitled to priority status or excepted from
discharge. Alimony must be distinguished from child support because each
obligation provides its own, distinct function. Children are dependent upon
support because they do not have the capacity to provide for themselves,
whereas full-grown adults do retain this capacity. Overall, all support debts
should be excepted from discharge. With respect to a few previously noted
exceptions, the overpayment of child support should be entitled to priority status,
whereas the overpayment of alimony should not.
D. The Intent and Current Condition of the Parties Involved
To further understand how overpaid support creditors should be treated
within the Code, specific facts pertaining to the parties involved must be
considered. The Code dictates that a debt in the nature of alimony, maintenance,
or support is considered a DSO.280 Whether an overpaid support obligation falls
within this definition of a DSO is dependent on a multitude of fact-specific
criteria.281 An inquiry into these factors is necessary to determine if overpaid
support debts are (1) defined as DSOs, (2) excepted from discharge, and (3)
entitled to priority status.
279
280
281
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Time and time again, bankruptcy courts have noted that an insight into the
intent and current condition of the parties involved is necessary in understanding
the debt in question.282 Furthermore, even though labels attached to debts can be
helpful in deciphering intent, “[t]he nature of the obligation is not restricted to
the parties’ label in the settlement agreement . . . .”283 Two perspectives must be
analyzed when looking at both the intent and the conditions of the parties. The
perspective of the creditor and the perspective of the debtor must be illustrated
respectively in order to understand why (1) the overpayment of child support
should be entitled to priority status, whereas the overpayment of alimony and
maintenance should not, and (2) all domestic support obligations are excepted
from discharge. This analysis will further help to explain the exceptions to these
standards.
1. Intent of the Parties
To embark on this analysis, the intent of the creditor must be understood. All
creditors that fall into this category have overpaid a support debt of some type
at some point in their lives.284 How this overpayment occurred is a pertinent
element for determining if the debt should be excepted from discharge or entitled
to priority status. The creditor can exhibit one of two intentions. The creditor
could either knowingly overpay the debt or unknowingly overpay the debt.
When knowingly overpaying a support debt, the creditor’s claim should not
fall within the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. This is because the
creditor is aware that his or her payments were completed and for some reason,
the creditor has continued providing support. At this point, the debt is no longer
in the nature of support. This is not because there is no “need” for support.
Rather, it is because the payments are no longer mandated by court order. As
previously discussed, when a creditor is knowingly overpaying a support debt
that is not controlled by pending litigation, the creditor is at fault for providing
such overpayments and should not be entitled to priority status.
A different outcome results when the creditor unknowingly overpays a
support debt.285 This analysis is complicated because it is dependent on the facts
of the specific case. This often occurs when a court retroactively terminates
support obligations. If the overpaid support debt at issue is a child support order,
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See Taylor v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 737 F.3d 670, 676–77 (10th Cir. 2013).
See id.
284
See, e.g., id.; Norbut v. Norbut (In re Norbut), 387 B.R. 199, 210 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2008).
285
See In re Alewelt, 520 B.R. 704, 712 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014) (alimony payments were retroactively
terminated but the court found no “need” for the funds).
283
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then it will be more likely than not that the debt should be afforded first
priority.286 If the child is deemed to have been provided with adequate care, then
there is no reason that the debt should not be returned as a DSO. This is true
because the debt is in the nature of support because the creditor believed the
payment was necessary for the adequate care and protection of the child or
children involved. On the contrary, if the creditor unknowingly overpaid an
alimony debt it is more likely than not that the creditor will not be afforded
priority status.287 This is because a higher standard of diligence288 should be
placed on overpaying alimony creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding. Current
trends show that alimony serves as a rehabilitative tool and not a lifelong safety
net.289 Thus, the creditor should carry the responsibility of knowing how long
and to what extent alimony payments are needed.
While looking at intent, a deeper analysis of the debtor’s motives for filing
a bankruptcy petition is needed. A bankruptcy court should evaluate a debtor’s
history and ask: why is this individual filing for bankruptcy? If it seems as if the
debtor is filing for relief predominantly to escape the overpaid DSO, red flags
should be raised. For instance, in the case of In re Galiardo the support receiver
debtor owed the support provider creditor over $200,000 in overpaid alimony
payments.290 It is likely that these debts triggered the filing of the bankruptcy
petition. In these situations, a court should scrutinize the situation to see if the
debtor is acting deceitful and declare the debt as a DSO prohibiting the debtor
from taking advantage of the chapter 13 loophole.291 However, if a debtor is
filing for bankruptcy predominately for other purposes, such as foreclosure or
consumer debt, the court does not have to scrutinize the debtor so closely.
Overall, the intent analysis requires courts to explore the perspectives of both
the creditor and debtor. If a creditor knowingly overpays a support debt, then the
debt is no longer within the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support and,
therefore, should not be entitled to priority status. The current structure of the
Code allows these debts to be discharged in chapter 13 cases.292 However, if a
creditor unknowingly overpays a support debt, a further analysis of the substance
of the obligation is needed. Creditors who overpay alimony are held to a higher

286

See, e.g., Kerr v. Meadors (In re Knott), 482 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012).
See generally Galiardo v. Galiardo (In re Galiardo), 526 B.R. 897 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2013).
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See supra Part C.
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See McMullen, supra note 52, at 9.
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See In re Galiardo, 526 B.R. at 899.
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See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (2019) (noting that debts listed in §523(a)(15) are dischargeable in a chapter
13 proceeding).
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standard of diligence than those who overpay child support. Furthermore, the
debtor’s motives for filing the petition must be considered. If the court finds that
the debtor filed their petition predominately to escape the overpaid DSO, the
debt should be found in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support to avoid
the debtor benefiting from the chapter 13 loophole.
2. Current Condition of the Parties
After analyzing the intent of the parties, the court must consider the parties’
current physical, mental, and financial condition. How a family functions is
critical in determining how a debt should be treated within a bankruptcy
proceeding. Regardless of whether the overpaid debt arises from child support
or alimony, the quality of care and the quality of life must be considered. The
undertaking of this analysis is case-specific in most circumstances. Because
child support and alimony are two distinct obligations, each one must be
considered separately. This inquiry is more relevant for cases concerning
overpaid child support orders.
When confronted with an overpaid child support debt, the court should look
to the current condition and treatment of the children. The age of the child or
children determines how much scrutiny the court needs to place on analyzing
the obligation. If the child is under sixteen years old, the court should be
extremely thorough in its investigation.293 However, the main aspect a court
must analyze, irrespective of age, is the quality of care the child is currently
receiving. If the overpayment is deemed necessary for adequate care, then the
debt should not be afforded priority status and should be discharged in a
bankruptcy proceeding. Once again, the rights of a child outweigh both the
creditor’s rights and the debtor’s rights.294 When looking to the best interest of
a child, there should always be a level of adequate care and protection
provided.295 If the court finds the overpayment is not necessary for the adequate
care of the children involved, the debt should be considered a DSO in the nature
of alimony, maintenance, or support. Unless the creditor is knowingly
overpaying, an overpaid child support debt should always be considered a DSO
that is excepted from discharge and afforded first priority status.

293
See United States Age of Consent Map, https://www.ageofconsent.net/states (last visited Feb. 25, 2019)
(This age derived from the majority age of consent in the United States).
294
See generally Sarah Abramowicz, Beyond Family Law, 63 CASE W. RES. 293, 299300 (2012).
295
See generally 3 NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE: MATRIMONIAL ACTIONS § 40.03 (2018) (This source
describes New York law and procedure but mirrors jurisdictions throughout the United States).
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When confronted with an overpaid alimony debt, the court should look to
the condition of the debtor. When analyzing the debtor’s quality of life, the
debtor’s condition must be analyzed in connection with the divorce decree. If
the court finds the overpayment was necessary296 according to the divorce
decree, then the debt may still be nondischargeable because it falls under
§ 523(a)(15).297 However, because of its nature, it should not be afforded first
priority status. Rather, it should be treated as a general unsecured claim. This
scenario protects the fresh start of the debtor. This situation is highly unlikely
because once a divorce is finalized, the alimony receiver is commonly required
to begin providing for him or herself rendering excess alimony payments
unnecessary.298
In most instances, where the overpayment is considered unnecessary, there
is no need to protect the debtor’s fresh start. This analysis is only needed in
extreme circumstances that the general rule does not provide for. The condition
of the creditor does not need to be scrutinized because it does not matter if the
creditor “needs” the payment. If the debt falls within the nature of support the
debt should automatically be a DSO that is both excepted from discharge and
entitled to priority status. Though overpaid alimony creditors are held to a higher
standard of diligence, courts must not confuse the word “need” for “nature”
when rendering opinions on overpaid support debts. When confronted with an
overpaid alimony debt, courts should declare the debt nondischargeable while
denying priority status due to the substance of the obligation.
Generally, the condition of the parties is a greater concern when analyzing
an overpaid child support debt. As long as children are receiving adequate care,
the general rule applies. Though the debtor’s quality of life may be analyzed
when confronted with an overpaid alimony debt, it is highly unlikely that a court
will find an overpayment necessary in accordance with the prescribed divorce
decree.
CONCLUSION
The Code fails to directly address overpaid support debts, leaving case law
as the sole source of guidance. The Code’s inattention to the issue has led to a
jurisdictional split that does not allow for a uniform set of standards. When
federal law is not evenly applied throughout the United States, the public’s
296
This scenario is very rare but may occur if the original divorce decree was insufficient for the needs of
the parties.
297
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2019).
298
See McMullen, supra note 52, at 8–9.
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values become skewed and individuals may attempt to use this inconsistency to
their advantage. Furthermore, when domestic relations are not left to the
discretion of state courts, the balance between federal bankruptcy law and state
domestic relations laws is disrupted. In order to reconcile this discrepancy,
bankruptcy courts should allow for a uniform set of standards when confronted
with overpaid support debts.
While all support debts should be excepted from discharge, the overpayment
of child support should be entitled to priority status whereas the overpayment of
alimony should not. After analyzing Congress’s intent in drafting the Code, the
intent and current condition of the parties, and the substance of the obligation, a
few exceptions emerge to this general rule. First, creditors who knowingly
overpay their child support debts should not be afforded priority status. Second,
if the child’s quality of life is inadequate, the debt should neither be afforded
priority status nor excepted from discharge when considering the public policy
objective of protecting the best interests of the child.299 Third, exceptions to
overpaid alimony debts arise when the debtor manipulates the creditor in a
malicious or deceitful manner. When this occurs, the overpaid alimony debt
must be afforded priority status.
The chapter 13 loophole partially restricts the application of these standards.
Because the application of § 523(a)(15) is conditional to chapter 7 cases, the
Code unintentionally creates this loophole300 allowing individuals to discharge
large sums of money stemming from a divorce decree. To close this gap,
§ 523(a)(15) should apply to chapter 13 cases conditional to overpaid support
obligations. If Congress elected to amend § 523(a)(15), debtors would not be
able to specifically file or covert their case to chapter 13 in hopes of avoiding
large sums of overpaid support debts.301 Currently, the only way to avoid this
area of contention is for courts to scrutinize why a debtor is filing for bankruptcy
to determine if he or she is acting deceitful.
This Comment creates standards that stem from public policy concerns. The
drafters of the Code sought to reflect the values and objectives of our society.302
As society has evolved, it has become clearly discernable that the parent-child
relationship is longer lasting than the spousal relationship.303 Due to this
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See McMullen, supra note 266, at 442.
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distinction, overpaying alimony creditors should be held to a higher standard of
diligence than overpaying child support creditors.304 Moreover, the bankruptcy
system must encourage parents to continue paying their child support without
hesitation. Overpaid support debts should not be categorized as general
unsecured claims in bankruptcy proceedings. This may cause future payees to
withhold their child support payments when suspicion arises that an ex-spouse
is suffering from financial hardship. In order to keep familial values in high
regard, these general sets of standards must be followed when courts are
confronted with overpaid support debts.
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